Fodor’s RHBS model on the resurrection: Part III
Methodological naturalism and miracles
Part I was on reburial (R) and Part II on individual hallucinations (H). Parts III and IV will consider “Biases” (B). To follow the “biases” element of Fodor’s model, we must first understand his methodological naturalist approach.
I define methodological naturalism, as acting as if metaphysical naturalism is true, until there is sufficient evidence to reconsider. Definitions of metaphysical naturalism differ. But common themes are:
- the physical is the source of all things (source physicalism)
- no gods exists
This article looks at the following:
- What criteria should we use to evaluate approaches like methodological naturalism?
- Advantages of methodological naturalism (MN)— minimising false positives (incorrectly concluding a miracle happened).
- Can methodological naturalism minimise false negatives (incorrectly concluding a miracle did not happen)?
What is a good method?
Criteria from signal detection theory are helpful for evaluating MN (see table 1). For example, radars detect the risk of intruders entering a territory. Sometimes there will be false positives —an incorrect judgment that we are at risk of attack (such as a civilian aircraft accidently entering our airspace).
False positives are burdensome. Air raid sirens interfere with everyday life. Yet our efforts to minimise false positives can lead to complacency.
If our radars cannot pick up enemy planes — we are at risk of false negatives. An effective method balances false positives and false negatives.
Advantages of an MN approach
Fodor’s MN approach does well at eliminating false positives. To act as if metaphysical naturalism is true, requires a prior probability (probability of an event before assessing evidence) for miracles of zero — or at least very close to zero.
In other words, a positive (conclusion that miracles happened) is close to impossible. Given this assumption, regardless of the evidence, our methods will lead to few, if any, positives. Which in turn means few, if any, false positives.
Hume’s solution to false negatives?
Fodor, following Hume several hundred years later, concludes all known miracle claims have failed. Is this due to a rigorous elimination of false positives? Avoiding the gullibility of pre-enlightenment societies and cultures? Or is his method vulnerable to false negatives?
David Hume, an eighteenth century philosopher, was aware of the risk of false negatives. Though he probably would not have used that exact term. In response, he proposed a scenario where a violation of nature (Hume’s term for a miracle) — eight days of continuous darkness — had occurred.
What would be sufficient evidence? Some have argued Hume thought miracles were impossible. Or, at least, sufficient evidence was not possible. But he denies both:
…there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony.
Hume proposed the following evidence would convince him a violation of nature had occurred:
Thus, suppose, all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from the first of January 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: it is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived.
Hume’s criteria
Does Hume’s MN approach manage to discriminate between true positives and false negatives? On the face of it — yes. Hume proposed sufficient evidence to conclude a miracle occurred—a “true positive”. He also provided criteria to check this conclusion (often called “Hume’s Maxim”):
That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact which it endeavours to establish.
JH Sobel, perhaps the greatest atheist philosopher of his generation, interpreted this mathematically. He argued this meant the prior probability of a miracle must be greater than the probability that the testimony is false (if a miracle did not happened).
Evaluation
There is no space to evaluate Hume’s theoretical miracle in any detail here (for further details see Meader 2024, or here). I have argued his conclusion, that there is sufficient evidence for this theoretical miracle, is inconsistent with Hume’s maxim:
- The prior probability of eight days of continuous darkness is prohibitively low. If not zero, as close as could be, applying methodological naturalism.
2. It is very unlikely that we would observe the evidence proposed by Hume, assuming that eight days of continuous darkness did not happen. In other words, the evidence is very strong.
3. However, the prior probability of this miracle (premise one) is almost certainly lower than the probability of observing the evidence in premise two.
Therefore, Hume’s maxim leads to a false negative — an incorrect judgment that a miracle did not happen. Hume must choose between:
- The ability to identify true positives (e.g. his theoretical miracle).
- And his “maxim” — which he used to reject all known miracle claims.
“Lakatos” model of miracle beliefs
Of course, it does not follow that because Hume’s approach is vulnerable to false negatives, that Fodor’s is too. We must consider his approach on its own merits.
Fodor posits psychological or sociological biases as the cause of miracle claims. He cites various papers providing naturalistic explanations for miracle claims (mainly related to divine healing). I will focus on the paper by Stoltz (2011), because it uses the most transparent methods.
Stoltz’s study proposes a naturalistic model of Pentecostal healing claims. He starts with the audiences’ Lakatos type beliefs (from the famous philosopher Imre Lakatos) in miracles:
- Unfalsifiable hardcore beliefs: worldviews about ultimate reality.
- Protective belt: ‘hypotheses, conjectures, ideas, arguments,
etc.’ designed to protect hardcore beliefs. - Bounded rationality: ‘individuals have subjectively “good
reasons” for their beliefs and actions’ but may err due to bias.
Table 2 summarises Stoltz’s categorisation of Pentecostal beliefs. The difficulty is that Stoltz’s methods are, in my view, vulnerable to the same biases.
“Lakatos” model of MN
Stoltz (2011) acknowledges that many other groups share these Lakatosian type beliefs (including academics and non-religious people). Is this also the case for his “methodological atheist” method? If so, that weakens his deconstruction of miracle claims. Since, his deconstruction of miracle claims can be deconstructed on the same grounds.
Unfalsifiable hardcore beliefs
I’ve argued above a methodological naturalist approach is very unlikely to be falsifiable (see Meader 2024 for further details):
- A prior probability that miracles are close to impossible is unlikely to be amenable to contradictory evidence.
- Stoltz’s “methodological atheist” approach largely prohibits transcendent explanatory factors, which further weakens potential falsification.
Protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses
Applying these MN methods, means naturalistic auxiliary hypotheses are set a very low bar. As Bart Ehrman points out, in relation to Jesus’ resurrection, given methodological naturalism:
… any of these views [various naturalistic auxiliary hypotheses] is more plausible than the claim that God raised Jesus physically from the dead (Ehrman, 2016, p165).
If a naturalistic hypothesis is possible, it is more probable than a miracle. Therefore, this protective belt is limited only by our ability to conceive of naturalistic hypotheses.
Bounded rationality
As we will see in part IV, many of the sociological factors proposed by Stoltz have a plausible impact on perceptions of healing. In addition, he remains open to exploration of “transcendent phenomena.” So I do not think he intends to rule out challenges to naturalism.
However, the unfalsifiable nature of methodological naturalism, and his very low bar for auxiliary naturalistic hypotheses, leaves Stoltz and Fodor’s conclusions vulnerable to bias.
References
Ehrman, Bart. How Jesus Became God. Boulder, CO: Bravo, 2015.
Hume, David. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. https://davidhume.org/ texts/e/ [accessed 5th February, 2024]
Meader, Nick. Extraordinary Evidence for an Extraordinary Claim. Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2024.
Stoltz, Jorg. “All Things Are Possible”: Towards a Sociological Explanation of Pentecostal Miracles and Healings. Sociology of Religion 72 (2011) 456–482.
